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Abstract
The instrumental variable method relies on a strong no-deﬁers condition, which
requires that the instrument aﬀect every subject's treatment decision in the same
direction. This paper shows that no-deﬁers can be replaced by a weaker compliers-
deﬁers condition, which requires that a subgroup of compliers have the same size and
the same distribution of potential outcomes as deﬁers. This condition is necessary and
suﬃcient for IV to capture causal eﬀects for the remaining part of compliers. In many
applications, compliers-deﬁers is a very weak condition. For instance, in Angrist &
Evans (1998), 94% of DGPs compatible with the data satisfy compliers-deﬁers, while
0% satisfy no-deﬁers.
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1 Introduction
Instrumental variable (IV) is a standard tool to measure the eﬀect of a treatment. However,
IV relies on a strong no-deﬁers (ND) condition which might not always be credible.
Barua & Lang (2010) highlight several empirical papers in which it is fairly clear that some
subjects are deﬁers. This paper addresses this limitation. It shows that the aforementioned
ND assumption can be replaced by a substantially weaker condition, while leaving all the
standard theorems almost unchanged.
Imbens & Angrist (1994) and Angrist et al. (1996) show that IV captures a causal eﬀect
under three assumptions: random assignment, exclusion restriction, and no-deﬁers. The
parameter it identiﬁes is the eﬀect of the treatment among subjects who are induced to
get treated because of the instrument, whom they call compliers. This is the so-called
local average treatment eﬀect (LATE). ND means that the instrument will never induce
a subject not to get treated. If it is violated, the IV estimate may be misleading, as it
is equal to the average eﬀect of the treatment for compliers minus the average eﬀect for
deﬁers; even in a world where all eﬀects are positive, the IV estimand need not be positive.
Nevertheless, ND may be problematic in some applications. A ﬁrst example consists in
papers using sibling-sex composition as an IV to study the eﬀect of childbearing on labor
supply, as in Angrist & Evans (1998). When their ﬁrst two children are of the same sex, the
amount of parents having a third child is 6 percentage points higher than when their ﬁrst
two children are of a diﬀerent sex. This implies that some parents have a preference for
diversity. Those parents are compliers: the instrument induces them to have a third child.
But when their ﬁrst two children are girls, the amount of parents having a third child is
1.5 percentage points higher than when their ﬁrst two children are boys. This implies that
some parents are sex biased, either because they have a preference for boys, or because
they ﬁnd it more tiring to raise boys than girls. Among sex-biased parents, some might
decide to have a third child if their ﬁrst two children are a boy and a girl, while they would
have decided otherwise if their ﬁrst two children had been boys. Such parents would be
deﬁers, as the instrument would induce them not to have a third child.
A second example consists in papers using month of birth as an instrument for school entry
age, or for age when taking a test. As Barua & Lang (2010) argue, ND is problematic in
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those papers. A well-known example is Bedard & Dhuey (2006). This paper compares
test scores of children born before and after the cutoﬀ date for school eligibility. In most
countries, this cut-oﬀ date is January, 1. Children born in December should thus enter
school at a younger age than children born in January, and should subsequently take
national tests at a younger age as well. Nonetheless, as is well-known, parents are more
prone to delaying school entry of children born late in the year, so-called redshirting.
Children redshirted because they were born in December are deﬁers, as they would have
taken national tests at a younger age had they been born in January.
A third example consists in randomized experiments relying on an encouragement design.
In such designs, the encouragement group typically receives a ﬁnancial incentive to get
treated, or a ﬂyer describing the treatment, or both. ND means that the incentive and the
ﬂyer will positively impact every subject's treatment decision. In practice, those incentives
might have the expected positive eﬀect on a majority of subjects, but might still discourage
some of them from getting treated. For instance, the ﬂyer might lead some subjects to
think that the beneﬁt they can expect from treatment is lower than what they initially
thought.
A fourth example consists in papers using randomly assigned judges with diﬀerent sen-
tencing propensities as an instrument for incarceration length, as in Kling (2006). In those
papers, ND requires that, for every defendant, a judge with a high average of strictness will
hand down a sentence that is more severe than that of a judge who is on average more le-
nient. This might be violated. Assume judge A does not take into account the defendant's
socio-economic background, while judge B tends to be more lenient towards defendants
from disadvantaged environments, and more severe with defendants from well-oﬀ back-
grounds. If the pool of defendants bears more poor than rich individuals, judge B will be
on average more lenient than judge A, but he will be more severe with socio-economically
privileged defendants.
This paper shows that instruments still identify causal eﬀects if ND is replaced by a weaker
compliers-deﬁers (CD) condition. Let Y0 and Y1 respectively denote a subject's potential
outcome without and with the treatment. The CD assumption requires that a subgroup of
compliers, which I call comﬁers, have the same size and the same probability distribution of
Y0 and Y1 as deﬁers. Then, treatment eﬀects among comﬁers and deﬁers cancel one another
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out, and the IV estimate ﬁnally identiﬁes the average treatment eﬀect among the remaining
part of compliers. This second subgroup consists in compliers who out-survive deﬁers,
and accordingly I call them comvivors. Comvivors have the same size as the population
of compliers under ND; substituting CD to ND does not lead to a loss in terms of the
external validity of the identiﬁed parameter. Moreover, quantile treatment eﬀects among
comvivors are also identiﬁed under that condition. Finally, the distribution of any vector
of covariates among comvivors is identiﬁed as well, under a mild strengthening of the CD
condition.
CD is therefore suﬃcient for IV to capture causal eﬀect among a subpopulation of compli-
ers. It is also necessary: if IV captures treatment eﬀects for a subgroup of compliers, then
CD must hold.
Albeit somewhat abstract, CD stands in between two easily interpretable conditions. For
CD to be true, it suﬃces that there be more compliers than deﬁers in each stratum of the
population with the same value of (Y0, Y1), and it is necessary that there be more compliers
than deﬁers in each stratum with the same value of Y0 and in each stratum with the same
value of Y1. I call the former condition the more compliers than deﬁers (MC) condition,
and I call the latter the weak more compliers than deﬁers (WMC) condition.
The CD condition is close to being fully testable, at least when potential outcomes are
binary. WMC is testable from the data, for instance using the test developed in Kitagawa
(2008). CD implies WMC, but the converse is not true, as some DGPs satisfy WMC but
violate CD. Therefore, CD cannot be consistently tested. Notwithstanding, I conduct a
simulation exercise to show that when potential outcomes are binary, a very low fraction
of DGPs satisfying WMC violate CD. In Angrist & Evans (1998), Kitagawa's test is not
rejected. I put a uniform measure on the set of DGPs compatible with the data, and
ﬁnd that 94% of them satisfy CD, while 32% satisfy MC, and 0% satisfy ND. As a result,
CD is very likely to hold in this application; even an agnostic decision maker with this
uninformative uniform prior over the set of DGPs would choose to believe in it.
The CD condition does not arise from a structural model in which subjects make treat-
ment decisions after solving a utility maximization problem. Embedding this condition in
such a model would be useful, to assess whether it is signiﬁcantly weaker than ND not
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only from the perspective of an agnostic decision maker, but also from the perspective of
economic theory. Nonetheless, giving a structural interpretation to the CD condition is
not easy. Instead, I derive a structural interpretation of the MC condition, and discuss
how it compares with the structural interpretation of ND derived in Vytlacil (2002).
Vytlacil (2002) shows that ND is observationally equivalent to a single index model for
potential treatments. In this model, the instrument aﬀects the threshold above which
an observation gets treated, but it does not aﬀect the unobserved heterogeneity index.
Therefore, one interpretation of ND is that the instrument aﬀects the cost of treatment,
but not the beneﬁts subjects expect from it. This might be violated in the encouragement
design example, as subjects' expectations of treatment beneﬁts may be altered after reading
the ﬂyer.
MC is observationally equivalent to an asymmetric index model. In this model, the instru-
ment can aﬀect both the cost and the beneﬁt expected from treatment, provided that in
each (Y0, Y1) stratum there be more subjects whose expected beneﬁt is greater with than
without the instrument. In the encouragement design example, MC requires that the ﬂyer
be suﬃciently appealing to ensure that in each (Y0, Y1) cell, the number of subjects having
a worse opinion of the treatment is equal to or less than the number of subjects having a
better opinion of it after reading the ﬂyer.
In Vytlacil's single index model, compliers are marginal subjects; their expected beneﬁt
from treatment is too low for them to get treated if they do not receive any incentive, but
high enough for them to do so if they do receive one. Comvivors can receive a similar inter-
pretation, under a symmetric index model which is more restrictive than the asymmetric
one.
In a related paper, Small & Tan (2007) demonstrate that under MC, the Wald ratio
captures a weighted average treatment eﬀect. Nevertheless, their weights can lie outside
the unit interval. As a result, their weighting scheme does not capture causal eﬀects for
a well-deﬁned subpopulation of units. I show here that CD is necessary and suﬃcient to
capture causal eﬀects for a subgroup of compliers of known size, that I also describe in the
context of speciﬁc assignment models.
Other related papers include DiNardo & Lee (2011), who derive a result very similar to
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Small & Tan (2007). Klein (2010) introduces local violations of ND, and shows that
the bias of the Wald parameter can be well approximated if said violations are small.
When Kitagawa's test is rejected, meaning that both ND and CD are violated, Huber &
Mellace (2012) identify average treatment eﬀects on compliers and deﬁers under a local
ND condition. Finally, Hoderlein & Gautier (2012) introduce a selection model with ran-
dom coeﬃcients where there can be both deﬁers and compliers. But their instrument is
continuous, while mine is binary.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
introduces the MC, CD, and WMC conditions. Section 3 presents the main identiﬁcation
result of the paper. Section 4 shows that the distribution of any vector of covariates among
comvivors is identiﬁed under a weak strengthening of CD. Section 5 discusses the testability
of CD. Section 6 shows that even a bayesian decision maker with an uninformative prior
over the set of DGPs would choose to believe in CD in most applications in which it is
not rejected. Section 7 gives a structural interpretation to the MC condition and to the
comvivors population. Section 8 shows how the ideas presented in this paper extend to
other microeconometrics models relying on ND type of conditions. Section 9 concludes.
2 Framework and assumptions
For any random variable X, let S(X) denote the support of X. Let Z be a binary in-
strument. Let Dz ∈ {0; 1} denote a subject's potential treatment when Z = z.1 Let Ydz
denote her potential outcomes as functions of the treatment and of the instrument. Only
Z, D = DZ and Y = YDZ are observed. Following Imbens & Angrist (1994), never takers
(NT ) are subjects such that D0 = 0 and D1 = 0. Always takers (AT ) are such that
D0 = 1 and D1 = 1. Compliers (C) satisfy D0 = 0 and D1 = 1, while deﬁers (F )
2 satisfy
D0 = 1 and D1 = 0. Let T ∈ {NT ;AT ;C;F} be a random variable describing the type of
a subject.
1For now, I focus on binary instrument and treatment, but Section 8 extends some results of the paper
to multivariate instrument and treatment.
2In most of the treatment eﬀect literature, treatment is denoted by D. To avoid confusion, deﬁers are
denoted by the letter F throughout the paper.
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Angrist et al. (1996) assume ﬁrst that P (D = 1|Z = 1) > P (D = 1|Z = 0), which
means that the instrument has an eﬀect on the treatment rate. This is equivalent to the
rank condition in standard IV models. Under Assumption 2.1 (see below), this condition
implies that more subjects are compliers than deﬁers: P (C) > P (F ).3 Then, they make
three assumptions. First, they assume that the instrument is independent of potential
treatments and outcomes.
Assumption 2.1 (Instrument independence)
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11, D0, D1) ⊥⊥ Z.
Second, they assume that the instrument has an impact on the outcome only through its
impact on treatment.
Assumption 2.2 (Exclusion restriction)
∀d ∈ {0, 1},
Yd0 = Yd1 = Yd.
Third, they assume that the instrument moves all subjects into the same direction.
Assumption 2.3 (No-deﬁers: ND)
D1 ≥ D0.
This paper shows that Assumption 2.3 can be substantially weakened while keeping results
in Angrist et al. (1996) and Imbens & Rubin (1997) essentially unchanged. I consider a
ﬁrst weakening of ND, which is a special case of the stochastic monotonicity assumption
in Small & Tan (2007).
Assumption 2.4 (More compliers than deﬁers: MC, Small & Tan (2007))
Almost surely,
P (F |Y0, Y1) ≤ P (C|Y0, Y1). (2.1)
3If P (D = 1|Z = 1) < P (D = 1|Z = 0), one can switch the words deﬁers and compliers in what
follows.
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MC requires that each subgroup of the population with the same value of (Y0, Y1) comprise
more compliers than deﬁers. It is automatically satisﬁed when P (F ) = 0.
Angrist et al. (1996) show that the Wald ratio identiﬁes a LATE if there are no deﬁers,
or if deﬁers and compliers have the same distribution of (Y0, Y1). Those two assumptions
are polar cases of MC. Assume to simplify that Y0 and Y1 are discrete. Then, MC is
equivalent to
P (Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1|F )
P (Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1|C) ≤
P (C)
P (F )
. (2.2)
Therefore, MC holds when deﬁers and compliers have the same distribution of (Y0, Y1), as
the left hand side of Equation (2.2) is then equal to 1, while its right hand side is greater
than 1.4 And MC also holds when there are no deﬁers, as P (F ) = 0 implies that the right
hand side of Equation (2.2) is equal to +∞.
In between those two polar cases, MC holds in many intermediate cases. Equation (2.2)
shows that under MC, the more deﬁers there are, the less the distribution of (Y0, Y1) among
compliers and deﬁers can diﬀer, and conversely. Indeed, when compliers and deﬁers have
very diﬀerent distributions of (Y0, Y1), i.e. when the highest value of
P (Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1|F )
P (Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1|C)
is large, P (F ) should be close to 0 for Equation (2.2) to hold. On the contrary, when P (F )
is close to P (C), compliers and deﬁers should have very similar distributions of potential
outcomes for Equation (2.2) to hold. Therefore, MC will hold if few subjects are deﬁers,
or if deﬁers and compliers have reasonably similar distributions of potential outcomes. On
the contrary, if many subjects are deﬁers and deﬁers and compliers have very diﬀerent
distributions of potential outcomes, then MC will be violated.
MC is weaker than ND, but identiﬁcation results derived in this paper are obtained under
an even weaker condition. Before stating it, I introduce a very mild technical condition
which will be maintained throughout the paper.
Assumption 2.5 (Absolute continuity)
The vector (Y0, Y1, T ) has a density with respect to some σ-ﬁnite measure λ.
4I have assumed, as a mere normalization, that P (F ) is smaller than P (C).
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For any vector of random variables X absolutely continuous with respect to λ, let fX
denote the density of X. For any event A, let fX|A denote the density of X conditional on
A.
Assumption 2.6 (Compliers-deﬁers: CD)5
There is a real-valued function g deﬁned on S(Y0)× S(Y1) such that almost everywhere:
0 ≤ g(y0, y1) ≤ fY0,Y1,T (y0, y1, C) (2.3)∫
S(Y1)
g(y0, y1) dλ(y1) = fY0,T (y0, F ) (2.4)∫
S(Y0)
g(y0, y1) dλ(y0) = fY1,T (y1, F ). (2.5)
As I show in the proofs, CD ensures that a subgroup of compliers, hereafter referred to as
compliers-deﬁers, or comﬁers, has the same size and the same marginal distributions of
Y0 and Y1 as deﬁers. Conversely, if a subpopulation of compliers has the same size and the
same marginal distributions of Y0 and Y1 as deﬁers, then CD must hold.
CD is weaker than MC. Indeed, MC implies
0 ≤ fY0,Y1,T (y0, y1, F ) ≤ fY0,Y1,T (y0, y1, C)
almost everywhere.6 Then, fY0,Y1,T (y0, y1, F ) satisﬁes Equations (2.3), (2.4), and (2.5).
Albeit weaker than MC, CD is more diﬃcult to interpret. To ease its interpretation, I
consider a last assumption.
Assumption 2.7 (Weak more compliers than deﬁers: WMC)
Almost surely,
P (F |Y0) ≤ P (C|Y0)
P (F |Y1) ≤ P (C|Y1). (2.6)
5With a slight abuse of notation, λ should be understood in Equation (2.4) as the marginal measure
deﬁned on the σ-algebra associated to S(Y1). Similar abuses of notations appear at a few other places in
the paper, for instance in Equation (2.5).
6To see it, assume that fY0,Y1,T (y0, y1, F ) > fY0,Y1,T (y0, y1, C) over a set A with strictly positive prob-
ability. This implies P (F |(Y0, Y1) ∈ A) > P (C|(Y0, Y1) ∈ A) which violates MC.
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For WMC to hold, each subgroup of the population with the same value of Y0 should
comprise more compliers than deﬁers, and each subgroup with the same value of Y1 should
also comprise more compliers than deﬁers.
CD is stronger than WMC. Indeed, integrating
g(y0, y1) ≤ fY0,Y1,T (y0, y1, C)
over S(Y1) and dividing each side of the resulting inequality by fY0(y0) yields P (F |Y0 =
y0) ≤ P (C|Y0 = y0). Integrating the same inequality over S(Y0) and dividing each side by
fY1(y1) yields P (F |Y1 = y1) ≤ P (C|Y1 = y1).
As MC ⇒ CD ⇒ WMC, CD is stronger than having more compliers than deﬁers in each
Y0 and each Y1 subgroup, but it is weaker than having more compliers than deﬁers in each
(Y0, Y1) subgroup.
3 Identiﬁcation of local treatment eﬀects under CD
Let
f0(y0) =
fY,D|Z=0(y0, 0)− fY,D|Z=1(y0, 0)
P (D = 0|Z = 0)− P (D = 0|Z = 1)
f1(y1) =
fY,D|Z=1(y1, 1)− fY,D|Z=0(y1, 1)
P (D = 1|Z = 1)− P (D = 1|Z = 0)
W =
E(Y |Z = 1)− E(Y |Z = 0)
E(D|Z = 1)− E(D|Z = 0) .
W is the Wald ratio; f0 f1 are functions appearing in Imbens & Rubin (1997). All those
quantities are identiﬁed from the data, as they only involve Y , D, and Z.
Imbens & Angrist (1994), Angrist et al. (1996), and Imbens & Rubin (1997) show the
following results.
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LATE Theorems
Suppose Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 hold. Then,
P (C) = P (D = 1|Z = 1)− P (D = 1|Z = 0)
fY0|C(y0) = f0(y0)
fY1|C(y1) = f1(y1)
E [Y1 − Y0|C] = W.
Under the standard LATE assumptions, the size of compliers and their marginal distri-
butions of Y0 and Y1 are identiﬁed from the data. As a result, the average eﬀect of the
treatment as well as quantile treatment eﬀects are identiﬁed within that subpopulation.
Theorem 3.1 generalizes this result, by showing that when CD is substituted to ND, the
Wald ratio identiﬁes the average eﬀect of the treatment for a subgroup of compliers of size
P (D = 1|Z = 1)− P (D = 1|Z = 0), while f0 and f1 identify the marginal distributions of
Y0 and Y1 for the same subpopulation.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold.
If Assumption 2.6 holds, then there is a subpopulation of compliers CV such that:
P (CV ) = P (D = 1|Z = 1)− P (D = 1|Z = 0) (3.1)
fY0|CV (y0) = f0(y0) (3.2)
fY1|CV (y1) = f1(y1) (3.3)
E [Y1 − Y0|CV ] = W. (3.4)
Conversely, if there is a subpopulation of compliers CV satisfying Equations (3.1), (3.2),
(3.3), and (3.4), then Assumption 2.6 must hold.
When there are deﬁers, Angrist et al. (1996) show that the Wald ratio is equal to a weighted
diﬀerence between the average eﬀect of the treatment among compliers and deﬁers:
W =
P (C)E [Y1 − Y0|C]− P (F )E [Y1 − Y0|F ]
P (C)− P (F ) . (3.5)
The numerator of the Wald ratio is the diﬀerence between E(Y |Z = 1) and E(Y |Z = 0).
Always takers and never takers vanish away in this numerator, as the same potential
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outcome is observed for them irrespective of whether Z = 1 or Z = 0. Only compliers and
deﬁers remain. Compliers go from treatment to non-treatment when the instrument moves
from 1 to 0, which is the reason why their average treatment eﬀect appears. Deﬁers go
from non-treatment to treatment, so that the opposite of their treatment eﬀect appears.
Therefore, Angrist et al. (1996) argue that the Wald ratio has no causal interpretation
when there are deﬁers; it could for instance be positive while the average treatment eﬀect
is negative both among compliers and deﬁers.
But if a subpopulation of comﬁers CF has the same size and the same marginal distributions
of potential outcomes as deﬁers, then the Wald ratio captures the average eﬀect of the
treatment among the remaining part of compliers, CV . In such instances, the average
eﬀect of the treatment among compliers can be decomposed into
E [Y1 − Y0|C]
= P (CV |C)E [Y1 − Y0|CV ] + P (CF |C)E [Y1 − Y0|CF ]
=
P (C)− P (F )
P (C)
E [Y1 − Y0|CV ] + P (F )
P (C)
E [Y1 − Y0|F ] . (3.6)
Plugging Equation (3.6) into (3.5), yields
W = E [Y1 − Y0|CV ] .
Intuitively, this is because the average treatment eﬀect among comﬁers and deﬁers cancel
one another out in Equation (3.5). Therefore, CV are hereafter referred to as compliers-
survivors, or comvivors, as they are compliers who out-survive deﬁers.
As a result, proving the ﬁrst statement of Theorem 3.1 amounts to proving that if CD
holds, then a subpopulation of compliers CF has the same size and the same marginal
distributions of potential outcomes as deﬁers. I use a constructive argument to prove this,
by showing that one can always construct such a subgroup CF when CD is satisﬁed. To
convey the intuition, I consider ﬁrst an example in which MC holds, as is the case in Figure
1. Y0 and Y1 are binary. The population bears 20 subjects. 13 of them are compliers, while
7 are deﬁers. Those 20 subjects are scattered over the 4 (Y0, Y1) cells as shown in Figure
1. MC holds as there are more compliers than deﬁers in each cell.
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C={c1 c2} C={c3 c4 c5}
F={f1} F={f2 f3}
C={c6 c7 c8 c9} C={c10 c11 c12 c13}
F={f4 f5} F={f6 f7}
 CV={c2} CV={c4}
CF={c1} CF={c3 c5} 
F={f1} F={f2 f3}
CV={c6 c7} CV={c11 c12 }
CF={c8 c9} CF={c10 c13}
F={f4 f5} F={f6 f7}
P: 0.30 P: 0.30
P(C): 0.20 P(C): 0.10
P(G): 0.30 P(G): 0.15
P: 0.20 P: 0.20
P(C): 0.10 P(C): 0.10
P(G): 0.15 P(G): 0.15
P(Y(0)=0,Y(1)=0)=0.30 P(Y(0)=0,Y(1)=1)=0.30
P(Y(0)=0,Y(1)=0,C)=0.20 P(Y(0)=0,Y(1)=1,C)=0.10
P(Y(0)=1,Y(1)=0)=0.20 P(Y(0)=1,Y(1)=1)=0.20
P(Y(0)=1,Y(1)=0,C)=0.10 P(Y(0)=1,Y(1)=1,C)=0.10
P(Y(0)=0,Y(1)=0)=0.30 P(Y(0)=0,Y(1)=1)=0.30
P(Y(0)=0,Y(1)=0,C)=0.20 P(Y(0)=0,Y(1)=1,C)=0.10
P(Y(0)=0,Y(1)=0,G)=0.30 P(Y(0)=0,Y(1)=1,G)=0.15
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Figure 1: An example in which MC is satisﬁed.
To construct CF , it suﬃces to choose at random
fY0,Y1,T (y0, y1, F )
Y0,Y1,T (y0, y1, C)
%
of compliers in each of the four (Y0, Y1) strata. This amounts to picking up
0.05
0.1
= 1
2
of
compliers in the (Y0, Y1) = (0, 0) stratum,
0.1
0.15
= 2
3
of them in the (Y0, Y1) = (0, 1) stratum,
and 0.1
0.2
= 1
2
of them in the (Y0, Y1) = (1, 0) and (Y0, Y1) = (1, 1) strata. The populations
CF and CV resulting from this construction are displayed in Figure 2. CF has both the
same size and the same joint distribution of (Y0, Y1) as deﬁers, which ensures that it has
the same marginal distributions of Y0 and Y1.
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Figure 2: Constructing CF and CV in this ﬁrst example.
But MC is not necessary for Theorem 3.1 to hold. To see it, consider Figure 3. In
this second example, MC is not satisﬁed as there are more deﬁers than compliers in the
(Y0, Y1) = (0, 1) cell. On the contrary, CD holds. One can for instance set g(0, 0) =
g(0, 1) = g(1, 1) = 3
25
and g(1, 0) = 1
25
.
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Figure 3: An example in which MC is not satisﬁed.
Then, to construct CF , it suﬃces to choose at random
g(y0, y1)
fY0,Y1,T (y0, y1, C)
%
of compliers in each of the four (Y0, Y1) strata. This amounts to picking up
3
5
of compliers
in the (Y0, Y1) = (0, 0) stratum, all of them in the (Y0, Y1) = (0, 1) stratum,
1
3
of them in
the (Y0, Y1) = (1, 0) stratum, and
3
4
of them in the (Y0, Y1) = (1, 1) stratum. One can check
from Figure 4 that CF has the same size and the same marginal distributions of Y0 and Y1
as deﬁers.
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Figure 4: Constructing CF and CV in this second example.
4 Who belongs to CV ?
The LATE I exhibit applies to a diﬀerent population than the one identiﬁed in Imbens &
Angrist (1994). This CV population is more abstract, and could potentially be even more
speciﬁc than the standard population of compliers. Hence the need to be able to describe
it, so as to assess whether this LATE is likely to apply to other populations or not. Under
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ND, the distribution of any vector of covariates X among compliers is identiﬁed. This is a
consequence of the κ result in Abadie (2003). A weak strengthening of CD is suﬃcient for
the distribution of X and the eﬀect of the treatment to be identiﬁed within a subpopulation
a compliers.
Assumption 4.1 (CD-X)
There is a real-valued function g deﬁned on S(Y0)×S(Y1)×S(X) such that almost every-
where:
0 ≤ g(y0, y1, x) ≤ fY0,Y1,X,T (y0, y1, x, C) (4.1)∫
S(Y1)×S(X)
g(y0, y1, x) dλ(y1, x) = fY0,T (y0, F ) (4.2)∫
S(Y0)×S(X)
g(y0, y1, x) dλ(y0, x) = fY1,T (y1, F ) (4.3)∫
S(Y0)×S(Y1)
g(y0, y1, x) dλ(y0, y1) = fX,T (x, F ). (4.4)
A suﬃcient condition for CD-X to hold is that there be more compliers than deﬁers in each
subgroup of the population with the same value of (Y0, Y1, X).
CD-X is stronger than CD. If g(y0, y1, x) satisﬁes Equations (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3), then
h(y0, y1) =
∫
S(X)
g(y0, y1, x)dλ(x)
satisﬁes (2.3), (2.4), and (2.5).7
CD-X is suﬃcient to ensure that the distribution of X and the eﬀect of the treatment are
identiﬁed within a subpopulation a compliers. Let
l(x) =
fX,D|Z=0(x, 0)− fX,D|Z=1(x, 0)
P (D = 0|Z = 0)− P (D = 0|Z = 1) .
Theorem 4.1 Suppose Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 4.1 hold. Then there is a subpopulation
7It is straightforward that h satisﬁes (2.3). To see that it satisﬁes for instance (2.4), it suﬃces to
integrate h over S(Y1), use the Fubini-Tonelli theorem, and then use Equation (4.2).
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of compliers CV such that:
P (CV ) = P (D = 1|Z = 1)− P (D = 1|Z = 0) (4.5)
fY0|CV (y0) = f0(y0) (4.6)
fY1|CV (y1) = f1(y1) (4.7)
E [Y1 − Y0|CV ] = W (4.8)
fX|CV (x) = l(x). (4.9)
This theorem shows that under CD-X, there is a population CV for which both treatment
eﬀects and the distribution of X are identiﬁed. Therefore, one can describe CV , to assess
whether it diﬀers from the remaining part of the population. Under ND, l(.) captures the
distribution of X among the entire population of compliers. As a result, the distribution
of X for CV under the CD-X condition is the same as the distribution of X for compliers
under the ND condition. Here again, substituting CD-X to ND does not lead to a change
in the quantities to be estimated, but it changes their interpretation.
5 Testability
As pointed out in Imbens & Rubin (1997), the standard LATE assumptions - random
instrument, exclusion restriction, and ND - have testable implications. Kitagawa (2008)
develops the corresponding statistical test. As shown in the next lemma, the alternative
LATE assumptions - random instrument, exclusion restriction, and CD - have the same
testable implications. Moreover, if Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 are maintained hypothesis,
performing Kitagawa's test amounts to testing WMC.
Lemma 5.1
1. Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.6 imply that the following inequalities must hold almost
everywhere:
fY,D|Z=1(y0, 0) ≤ fY,D|Z=0(y0, 0)
fY,D|Z=0(y1, 1) ≤ fY,D|Z=1(y1, 1). (5.1)
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2. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, Equation (5.1) is equivalent to WMC.
Kitagawa's test is not a consistent test of CD, as some DGPs satisfy WMC but violate CD.
To see this, consider the joint distribution of (Y0, Y1, D0, D1) presented in Figure 5. This
joint distribution satisﬁes WMC, as the sum of each line and each column is smaller for
deﬁers than compliers. Still, it is impossible to construct a function g satisfying Equations
(2.3), (2.4), and (2.5). P (Y0 = 1, F ) = P (Y1 = 1, F ) = 0.2. To ensure that g satisﬁes
Equations (2.4) and (2.5), we must have
g(1, 1) + g(1, 0) = 0.2 (5.2)
and
g(1, 1) + g(0, 1) = 0.2. (5.3)
Since P (Y0 = 1, Y1 = 1, C) = 0.05, g(1, 1) must be smaller than 0.05 for Equation (2.3) to
hold. As a result, one must set
g(0, 1) = g(1, 0) ≥ 0.15.
Then,
P (Y0 = 0, F ) = P (Y1 = 0, F ) = 0.05.
Given g(0, 1) and g(1, 0), having
g(0, 0) + g(0, 1) = g(0, 0) + g(1, 0) = 0.05
would require setting
g(0, 0) ≤ −0.10,
which would violate Equation (2.3).
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Figure 5: WMC does not imply CD.
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As shown in Kitagawa (2008), Equation (5.1) is the strongest testable implication of ND:
if it is satisﬁed in the data, it is possible to rationalize ND. As ND is stronger than MC
or CD, Equation (5.1) is also the strongest testable implication of those two assumptions.
Therefore, there is no consistent test of ND, MC, or CD.
6 Should we believe in CD? The perspective of an agnostic deci-
sion maker
Consider a bayesian decision maker who has to decide whether to believe or not in CD,
MC, and ND, in an application where potential outcomes are binary. Let J denote the
joint distribution of (Y0, Y1, D0, D1). As potential outcomes are binary,
J = (P (Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1, D0 = d0, D1 = d1))(y0,y1,d0,d1)∈{0;1}4
is merely a vector in [0, 1]16 whose coordinates sum up to 1. Let Jpr denote the set of all
such vectors. Before the data is revealed, J can be any element of that set.
The prior distribution of that decision maker for J is the same as the distribution of
U |U ∈ Jpr, where U denotes a vector of 16 independent random variables uniformly
distributed on [0, 1]. As it is symmetric, this prior is invariant to relabeling the parameters
of the DGP. It is therefore uninformative, both on the size of each type (always takers,
never takers, compliers, and deﬁers), and on their distribution of potential outcomes. This
implies, for instance, that before the data reveals the distribution of (Y,D,Z), the decision
maker assigns the same weight to the two following statements: the population comprises
30% of compliers, 20% of deﬁers, 40% of never takers, and 10% of always takers, and the
population comprises 10% of compliers, 30% of deﬁers, 20% of never takers, and 40% of
always takers. À priori, she does not believe that some types are likely to outnumber the
others in the population.
Then, the data (asymptotically) reveals the distribution of (Y,D,Z). This imposes some
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equality and inequality constraints on the 16 coordinates of J . For instance, we must have
P (Y = 0, D = 0|Z = 0)− P (Y = 0, D = 0|Z = 1)
= P (Y0 = 0, Y1 = 0, D0 = 0, D1 = 1) + P (Y0 = 0, Y1 = 1, D0 = 0, D1 = 1)
− (P (Y0 = 0, Y1 = 0, D0 = 1, D1 = 0) + P (Y0 = 0, Y1 = 1, D0 = 1, D1 = 0)).
This reduces the set of potential DGPs to Jpo, the set of elements in [0, 1]16 compatible
with all those constraints. The posterior distribution of the decision maker for J is the
distribution of U |U ∈ Jpo.
Let ND,MC, and CD be the set of joint distributions of (Y0, Y1, D0, D1) satisfying respec-
tively ND, MC, and CD. If the decision maker's loss function is symmetric in Type 1 and
Type 2 error, she will choose to believe, for instance, in CD if and only if Ppo(J ∈ CD) ≥ 12 .
Ppo(J ∈ CD), Ppo(J ∈MC), and Ppo(J ∈ ND) can be approximated using a Monte-Carlo
method, by drawing realizations of vectors U belonging to Jpo and by computing the share
of them which respectively belong to CD,MC, and ND.8
With a ﬁnite sample, the data does not reveal the joint distribution of (Y,D,Z). There-
fore, we can only estimate Ppo(J ∈ CD), Ppo(J ∈MC), and Ppo(J ∈ ND), by substituting
(P̂ (Y = y,D = d|Z = z))(y,d,z)∈{0;1}3 with (P (Y = y,D = d|Z = z))(y,d,z)∈{0;1}3 when
conducting the Monte-Carlo simulations described above. The resulting estimator is con-
sistent.9
In Angrist & Evans (1998), this agnostic decision maker with a symmetric loss function will
choose to believe in CD but not in MC or ND. Their main outcome Y is a binary variable
for female participation to the labor market. Treatment D is a dummy for having three
children or more. The instrument Z is a dummy equal to one when the ﬁrst two children
in a family are of the same sex. Computations are based on the 1980 PUMS sample, which
bears 394 840 observations. As shown in Huber (2012), Kitagawa's test is not rejected in
this data. Monte-Carlo simulations yield P̂po(J ∈ CD) ≈ 94%, P̂po(J ∈ MC) ≈ 32%, and
8When potential outcomes are binary, it is easy to determine whether a joint distribution of
(Y0, Y1, D0, D1) satisﬁes CD or not.
9This follows from the continuous mapping theorem, once noted that Jpo is a continuous function of
(P (Y = y,D = d|Z = z))(y,d,z)∈{0;1}3 , and that P (U ∈ A|U ∈ B) is continuous in B by continuity of the
cumulative distribution function of U .
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P̂po(J ∈ ND) = 0%.10 As the sample size is large, those estimates can be regarded as
fairly precise approximations of the true underlying parameters.
Angrist & Evans (1998) is not an exception: for most distributions of observables
(P (Y = y,D = d|Z = z))(y,d,z)∈{0;1}3
satisfying WMC, a very large share of the corresponding set of admissible DGPs also sat-
isﬁes CD. To show this, I draw 200 distributions of observables from uniform distributions,
imposing that
P (Y = y,D = d|Z = d) ≥ P (Y = y,D = d|Z = 1− d),
for every (y, d) ∈ {0; 1} × {0; 1},11 and
P (Y = 0, D = 0|Z = z) + P (Y = 1, D = 0|Z = z)
+ P (Y = 0, D = 1|Z = z) + P (Y = 1, D = 1|Z = z)
be equal to 1 for every z ∈ {0; 1}. For each of those distributions of observables, the
corresponding value of Ppo(J ∈ CD) is approximated using a Monte-Carlo simulation. The
average value of Ppo(J ∈ CD) is 81%, while its median is 88%. Ppo(J ∈ CD) is greater than
50% in 90% of cases. It sometimes takes very low values (the lowest value of Ppo(J ∈ CD)
is 0%), but only when
P (Y = y,D = d|Z = d)− P (Y = y,D = d|Z = 1− d)
is very low for some value of (y, d), meaning that the WMC assumption is close to being
violated. Among vectors such that for every (y, d)
P (Y = y,D = d|Z = d)− P (Y = y,D = d|Z = 1− d) ≥ 0.02,
the lowest value of Ppo(J ∈ CD) is 41%.
When interested in a binary outcome, applied researchers can run simulations similar to
those I conducted to assess how credible CD is in the application they consider.12 This
10This is merely because ND constrains 4 coordinates of J to be equal to 0. As a result, ND is of a
strictly lower dimension than Jpo, which implies that the Lebesgue measure of ND relative to Jpo is 0.
11This ensures that WMC is satisﬁed.
12The Stata code is available upon request.
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bayesian analysis could be extended to multivariate outcomes with ﬁnite support, even
though the simulations will become more cumbersome as the support of the outcome
grows. It would be more challenging to extend this type of analysis to outcomes with
inﬁnite support.
As per this uniform prior, DGPs satisfying ND will always account for 0% of DGP com-
patible with the data. This does not mean ND is always an incredible assumption. In
some applications, economic theory gives strong arguments supporting ND. In such cases,
it might not be insightful to adopt the perspective of an agnostic decision maker with an
uninformative prior, as we have good reasons not to be agnostic. The following section
reviews the standard structural interpretation of ND, and derives structural interpreta-
tions of the MC and WMC conditions, to discuss how those assumptions compare from
the perspective of economic theory.
7 A structural interpretation of the MC and WMC conditions
The CD condition does not arise from a structural model in which subjects make treatment
decisions after solving a utility maximization problem. Embedding this condition in such a
model would be useful, to assess whether it is signiﬁcantly weaker than ND not only from
the perspective of an agnostic decision maker, but also from the perspective of economic
theory. Nonetheless, giving a structural interpretation to the CD condition is not easy.
Instead, I give structural interpretations of both the MC and WMC conditions. As CD
stands in between the two, its structural interpretation will also stand in between the
interpretation of MC and WMC.
Without any loss of generality, one can always write
Dz = 1{Vz ≥ vz}, (7.1)
with v0 ≥ v1. This can be interpreted as a rational choice model: when Z = z, a subject
gets treated if and only if the beneﬁt she expects from treatment (Vz) is greater than its
cost (vz).
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Then, let beneﬁt-compliers (BC) satisfy
{V0 < v1, V1 ≥ v0},
while cost-compliers (CC) satisfy
{(V0, V1) ∈ [v1, v0)2}.
BC and CC deﬁne a partition of compliers. Beneﬁt compliers would comply even if the
instrument had no impact on the cost of treatment, i.e. if v1 = v0. Cost compliers are the
remaining part of compliers.
As shown in Vytlacil (2002), the restriction ND imposes on the fully general model pre-
sented in Equation (7.1) is
Assumption 7.1 (Single Index)
V0 = V1 = V. (7.2)
Under this restriction, the fully general model becomes a single index model. Compliers
can only be cost compliers, and they satisfy V ∈ [v1, v0). They are marginal subjects:
their expected beneﬁt from treatment is too low for them to get treated if they do not
receive an incentive, but high enough for them to get treated if they do receive one.
Following the rational choice interpretation outlined above, single index amounts to as-
suming that the instrument has no eﬀect on the expected beneﬁt from treatment. This
might not always be credible. For instance, in randomized controlled trials relying on an
encouragement design, the encouragement group typically receives a ﬂyer describing the
treatment, and a ﬁnancial incentive to get treated. As the ﬂyer conveys information on
the treatment, it might change the beneﬁts subjects expect from it.
MC imposes a weaker restriction than ND on the fully general model. Consider the fol-
lowing condition:
Assumption 7.2 (Asymmetric indexes: AI)
For every h ≥ l,
P (V0 < l, V1 ≥ h|Y0, Y1) ≥ P (V0 ≥ h, V1 < l|Y0, Y1) (7.3)
almost surely.
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In the encouragement design example, the AI condition means that even though the ﬂyer
might decrease the beneﬁts that some subjects expect from treatment, it is still appealing
enough to ensure that in each (Y0, Y1) subgroup there are at least as many subjects whose
expected beneﬁt from treatment increases from l to h after reading it, as there are subjects
whose expected beneﬁt decreases from h to l.
As shown in the next theorem, the AI condition is suﬃcient for MC to hold, but it does
not ensure that the CV population can receive a simple structural interpretation. This is
achieved under the following more restrictive condition:
Assumption 7.3 (Symmetric indexes: SI)
For every h ≥ l,
P (V0 < l, V1 ≥ h|Y0, Y1) = P (V0 ≥ h, V1 < l|Y0, Y1) (7.4)
almost surely.
In the encouragement design example, the SI condition requires that there be exactly as
many subjects whose expected beneﬁt from treatment increases from l to h after reading
the ﬂyer, as there as subjects for whom it decreases from h to l.
Theorem 7.1 Suppose potential treatments are generated following Equation (7.1).
1. If Assumption 7.2 holds, then Assumption 2.4 is satisﬁed.
2. If Assumption 7.3 holds, then CC satisﬁes Equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4).
3. If Assumption 2.4 holds, one can construct
(V ∗0 , V
∗
1 , v
∗
0, v
∗
1)
such that Equation (7.1) holds and Assumption 7.2 is satisﬁed.
The ﬁrst point of the theorem shows that if the true DGP of potential treatments satisﬁes
the AI condition, then MC holds. The second part shows that if this DGP satisﬁes the more
restrictive SI condition, then the CV population for which treatment eﬀects are identiﬁed
corresponds to cost-compliers. Finally, the third part shows that if MC holds, one can
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construct a DGP satisfying the AI condition. Therefore, the AI, SI, and MC conditions
are observationally equivalent. This generalizes Vytlacil (2002).
Finally, I sketch a structural interpretation of the CD condition. As discussed above, CD
stands in between MC and WMC. One can show that WMC is observationally equivalent
to a weaker AI condition: for every h ≥ l,
P (V0 < l, V1 ≥ h|Y0) ≥ P (V0 ≥ h, V1 < l|Y0)
P (V0 < l, V1 ≥ h|Y1) ≥ P (V0 ≥ h, V1 < l|Y1), (7.5)
almost surely. As a result, CD is weaker than imposing Equation (7.3), but it is stronger
than imposing only Equation (7.5).
8 Extensions
8.1 Extension to IV with multivariate treatment and instrument
Results on average eﬀects presented in this paper extend to applications where treatment
is multivariate. Assume that for every z ∈ {0; 1}, Dz ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., J} for some integer
J . Let (Yj)j∈{0,1,2,...,J} denote the corresponding potential outcomes. Assume the following
MC type of condition is veriﬁed: for every j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J},
P (D0 ≥ j > D1|Yj, Yj−1) ≤ P (D1 ≥ j > D0|Yj, Yj−1).
This condition means that in each (Yj, Yj−1) subgroup, there are less subjects who are
induced to go from a treatment greater than j to a treatment strictly lower than j because
of the instrument, than subjects who are induced to go from strictly below to above j.
Then, the Wald ratio captures the following average causal response:
J∑
j=1
wjE(Yj − Yj−1|CjV ).
CjV is a subset of the population satisfying {D1 ≥ j > D0} of size P (D1 ≥ j > D0) −
P (D0 ≥ j > D1), and
wj =
P (D1 ≥ j > D0)− P (D0 ≥ j > D1)
J∑
j=1
P (D1 ≥ j > D0)− P (D0 ≥ j > D1)
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are positive weights summing up to 1. This generalizes Theorem 1 in Angrist & Imbens
(1995).
Their Theorem 2 states that with a multivariate instrument Z ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., K}, if Dz′ ≥
Dz for every z
′ ≥ z, then the Wald ratio captures a weighted average of average causal
responses. This result can also be generalized under the following MC condition:13 for
every 0 ≤ z < z′ ≤ K and for every j ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., J},
P (Dz ≥ j > Dz′|Yj, Yj−1) ≤ P (Dz′ ≥ j > Dz|Yj, Yj−1).
8.2 Extension to other microeconometrics models
My results also extend to many treatment eﬀect models relying on ND type of conditions.
An important example is the fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) model studied in Hahn
et al. (2001). Their Theorem 3 still holds if their Assumption A.3, a ND at the threshold
assumption, is replaced for instance by a weaker MC at the threshold condition: almost
surely
P (F |Y0, Y1, S = s) ≤ P (C|Y0, Y1, S = s),
where S denotes the forcing variable, and s is the cut-oﬀ.
Finally, ND type of conditions have also been used in the sample selection and survey
non-response literatures, for instance in Lee (2009) or Behaghel et al. (2012). Let R0 and
R1 denote a subject's potential responses to a survey without and with the treatment.
Under the assumption that there are no response-deﬁers (R1 ≥ R0), Lee (2009) derives
sharp bounds for E(Y1 − Y0|R0 = 1, R1 = 1), the average eﬀect of the treatment among
always-respondents (AR).
Let RC and RF respectively denote reponse-compliers (subjects who satisfy R0 = 0
and R1 = 1) and response-deﬁers (subjects who satisfy R0 = 1 and R1 = 0). Under
the assumption that there are more response-compliers than response-deﬁers conditional
on (Y0, Y1), or under a weaker CD type of assumption, one can show that the bounds
derived in Lee (2009) are valid bounds for E(Y1 − Y0|AR ∪ RCF ), where RCF denotes a
13Theorem 1 and 2 in Angrist & Imbens (1995) could actually be generalized under even weaker CD
type of conditions.
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subpopulation of response compliers with the same marginal distributions of Y0 and Y1 as
response-deﬁers.
9 Concluding comments
In the IV model with heterogeneous eﬀects, the no-deﬁers condition can be replaced by a
weaker compliers-deﬁers condition, while maintaining the interpretation of IV estimates
as local eﬀects. Like no-deﬁers, compliers-deﬁers can be partly tested, through a proce-
dure developed in Kitagawa (2008). Few DGPs violate compliers-deﬁers and satisfy the
null hypothesis in Kitagawa's test. As a result, applied researchers should conduct this test
whenever they suspect there could be deﬁers in their application. If this test is not rejected
and the outcome they consider is binary, they can also conduct Monte-Carlo simulations
to assess which share of DGPs compatible with their data satisfy the CD assumption. This
will enable them to assess whether compliers-deﬁers is a strong or a weak assumption
in their application, and whether they can be highly conﬁdent or not in interpreting their
results as local eﬀects.
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A Proofs
Throughout the proofs, it is assumed that (Y0, Y1) takes values in an arbitrary measurable
space S(Y0)× S(Y1).
The proof of Theorem 3.1 relies on the following lemma:
Lemma A.1 There is a subpopulation of compliers CF such that:
P (CF ) = P (F ) (A.1)
fY0|CF (y0) = fY0|F (y0) (A.2)
fY1|CF (y1) = fY1|F (y1) (A.3)
if and only if Assumption 2.6 holds.
Proof of Lemma A.1:
Assume that Assumption 2.6 holds. Consider a function g which satisﬁes Equations (2.3),
(2.4), and (2.5). Densities being uniquely deﬁned up to 0 probability sets, I can assume
without loss of generality that those three equations hold everywhere. Then, let
p(y0, y1) =
g(y0, y1)
fY0,Y1,T (y0, y1, C)
1{fY0,Y1,T (y0, y1, C) > 0}.
Equation (2.3) ensures that this ratio is always included between 0 and 1. Then, let B be
a Bernoulli random variable such that P (B = 1|Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1, C) = p(y0, y1). Finally,
let CF = {C,B = 1}.
For every (y0, y1) ∈ S(Y0)× S(Y1),
fY0,Y1,1CF (y0, y1, 1)
= fY0,Y1,T,B(y0, y1, C, 1)
= fY0,Y1,T (y0, y1, C)P (B = 1|Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1, C)
= fY0,Y1,T (y0, y1, C)
g(y0, y1)
fY0,Y1,T (y0, y1, C)
1{fY0,Y1,T (y0, y1, C) > 0}
= g(y0, y1). (A.4)
The ﬁrst equality arises from the deﬁnition of CF . The second follows from Bayes rule.
The third follows from the deﬁnition of B. The fourth holds because under Equation (2.3),
fY0,Y1,T (y0, y1, C) = 0⇒ g(y0, y1) = 0.
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Therefore,
fY0,1CF (y0, 1) =
∫
S(Y1)
fY0,Y1,1CF (y0, y1, 1)dλ(y1)
=
∫
S(Y1)
g(y0, y1)dλ(y1)
= fY0,T (y0, F ). (A.5)
One can similarly show that
fY1,1CF (y1, 1) = fY1,T (y1, F ). (A.6)
Integrating (A.5) over S(Y0) yields (A.1). Dividing (A.5) and (A.6) by P (CF ) = P (F )
yields (A.2) and (A.3).
To prove the converse statement, it suﬃces to notice that if a subpopulation of compliers
CF satisﬁes Equations (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3), then fY0,Y1,1CF must satisfy Equations (2.3),
(2.4), and (2.5).
QED.
Proof of Theorem 3.1:
First, notice that a subgroup of compliers CV satisﬁes Equations (3.1), (3.2) , (3.3), and
(3.4) if and only if it satisﬁes
fY0,1CV (y0, 1) = fY,D|Z=0(y0, 0)− fY,D|Z=1(y0, 0) (A.7)
fY1,1CV (y1, 1) = fY,D|Z=1(y1, 1)− fY,D|Z=0(y1, 1). (A.8)
Similarly, as shown in the proof of Lemma A.1, a subgroup of compliers CF satisﬁes
Equations (A.1), (A.2) , and (A.3) if and only if it satisﬁes (A.5) and (A.6).
Combining those two remarks with Lemma A.1 shows that to prove Theorem 3.1, it suﬃces
to prove that there is a subgroup of compliers CV satisfying Equations (A.7) and (A.8) if
and only if there is a subgroup of compliers CF satisfying Equations (A.5) and (A.6).
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Then, notice also that
fY,D|Z=0(y0, 0)− fY,D|Z=1(y0, 0)
= fY0,D0(y0, 0)− fY0,D1(y0, 0)
= fY0,D0,D1(y0, 0, 0) + fY0,D0,D1(y0, 0, 1)
− fY0,D0,D1(y0, 0, 0)− fY0,D0,D1(y0, 1, 0)
= fY0,T (y0, C)− fY0,T (y0, F ). (A.9)
The ﬁrst equality follows from Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, the second one follows from the
law of total probabilities. Similarly one can show that
fY,D|Z=1(y1, 1)− fY,D|Z=0(y1, 1) = fY1,T (y1, C)− fY1,T (y1, F ). (A.10)
Now, assume that a subgroup of compliers CF satisﬁes Equations (A.5) and (A.6). Let
CV = C \ CF .
fY0,1CV (y0, 1) = fY0,T (y0, C)− fY0,1CF (y0, 1)
= fY0,T (y0, C)− fY0,T (y0, F )
= fY,D|Z=0(y0, 0)− fY,D|Z=1(y0, 0).
The ﬁrst equality follows from the law of total probabilities, the second one follows from
CF satisfying Equation (A.5), the last one follows from Equation (A.9). Similarly, one can
show that
fY1,1CV (y1, 1) = fY,D|Z=1(y1, 1)− fY,D|Z=0(y1, 1).
This proves that CV satisﬁes Equations (A.7) and (A.8).
Conversely, assume that a subgroup of compliers CV satisﬁes Equations (A.7) and (A.8).
Let CF = C \ CV .
fY0,1CF (y0, 1) = fY0,T (y0, C)− fY0,1CV (y0, 1)
= fY0,T (y0, C)−
(
fY,D|Z=0(y0, 0)− fY,D|Z=1(y0, 0)
)
= fY0,T (y0, F ).
The ﬁrst equality follows from the law of total probabilities, the second one follows from
CV satisfying Equation (A.7), the last one follows from Equation (A.9). Similarly, one can
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show that
fY1,1CF (y1, 1) = fY1,T (y1, F ).
This proves that CF satisﬁes Equations (A.5) and (A.6).
QED.
Proof of Theorem 4.1:
I sktech this proof only, as it is very similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1. Consider a
function g satisying Equations (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4). Let
q(y0, y1, x) =
g(y0, y1, x)
fY0,Y1,X,T (y0, y1, x, C)
1{fY0,Y1,X,T (y0, y1, x, C) > 0}.
Equation (4.1) ensures that this ratio is always included between 0 and 1. Then, let B
denote a Bernoulli variable such that P (B = 1|Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1, X = x,C) = q(y0, y1, x).
Finally, let CF = {C,B = 1}.
Following the same steps as for the proof of Lemma A.1, one can show that
P (CF ) = P (F )
fY0|CF (y0) = fY0|F (y0)
fY1|CF (y1) = fY1|F (y1)
fX|CF (x) = fX|F (x).
Following the same steps as for the proof of Theorem 3.1, one can then show that CV =
C \ CF satisﬁes Equations (4.5), (4.6), (4.7), (4.8), and (4.9).
QED.
Proof of Lemma 5.1
The ﬁrst point of the Lemma has already been proven elsewhere (see for instance Propo-
sition 1 in Kitagawa (2008)). I prove only the second point. Under Assumptions 2.1 and
2.2,
fY,D|Z=0(y0, 0)− fY,D|Z=1(y0, 0) = fY0,T (y0, C)− fY0,T (y0, F )
fY,D|Z=1(y1, 1)− fY,D|Z=0(y1, 1) = fY1,T (y1, C)− fY1,T (y1, F )
as shown above. Therefore, under those two assumptions (5.1) is equivalent to
fY0,T (y0, F ) ≤ fY0,T (y0, C)
fY1,T (y1, F ) ≤ fY1,T (y1, C).
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It suﬃces to divide the ﬁrst inequality by fY0(y0) and the second one by fY1(y1) to see that
they are equivalent to
P (F |Y0 = y0) ≤ P (C|Y0 = y0)
P (F |Y1 = y1) ≤ P (C|Y1 = y1).
QED.
Proof of Theorem 7.1
Proof of 1
Suppose Assumption 7.2 holds. For every (y0, y1) ∈ S(Y0)× S(Y1),
P (F |Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1) = P (V0 ≥ v0, V1 < v1|Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1)
≤ P (V0 < v1, V1 ≥ v0|Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1)
≤ P (V0 < v0, V1 ≥ v1|Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1)
= P (C|Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1).
The ﬁrst and last equality follow from Equation (7.1). The ﬁrst inequality follows from the
AI condition, as v0 ≥ v1. The second one follows from the fact that {V0 < v1, V1 ≥ v0} ⊆
{V0 < v0, V1 ≥ v1}, once again because v0 ≥ v1.
Proof of 2
Suppose Assumption 7.3 holds. For every (y0, y1) ∈ S(Y0)× S(Y1),
P (BC|Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1) = P (V0 < v1, V1 ≥ v0|Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1)
= P (V0 ≥ v0, V1 < v0|Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1)
= P (F |Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1).
The ﬁrst equality follows from the deﬁnition of beneﬁt-compliers. The second one follows
from the SI condition. The last one follows from Equation (7.1).
Multiplying both sides of the last equality by fY0,Y1(y0, y1) and integrating it over S(Y1)
implies that BC satisﬁes Equation (A.5). One can similarly show that BC satisﬁes Equa-
tion (A.6). Therefore, BC satisﬁes Equations (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3). Using the same
steps as for the proof of Theorem 3.1, one can then show that CC satisﬁes Equations (3.1),
(3.2), (3.3), and (3.4).
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Proof of 3
The proof is a generalization of the proof of the ﬁrst point of Proposition 2.1 in Chaise-
martin & D'Haultf÷uille (2012). Assume that Assumption 2.4 holds. Let
r(y0, y1) =
P (F |Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1)
P (C|Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1)1{P (C|Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1) > 0}.
r(y0, y1) is smaller than 1 under MC. Let B denote a Bernoulli random variable such that
P (B = 1|Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1, C) = r(y0, y1).
Let vz = P (Dz = 0). Let t0 = 0, t1 = P (D0 = 0, D1 = 0), t2 = P (D1 = 0), t3 = P (D0 = 0),
t4 = 1 − P (D0 = 1, D1 = 1), and t5 = 1. One can check that t0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ t3 ≤ t4 ≤ t5.
Then, consider (W0, ...,W4), mutually independent random variables, also independent of
(Y0, Y1, D0, D1, B). Take Wi uniform on [ti, ti+1]. Finally, let
V0 = (1−D0)(1−D1)W0 + (1−D0)D1(BW1 + (1−B)W2)
+ D0(1−D1)W3 +D0D1W4
V1 = (1−D0)(1−D1)W0 + (1−D0)D1(BW3 + (1−B)W2)
+ D0(1−D1)W1 +D0D1W4.
By construction, Dz = 1{Vz ≤ vz} almost surely. Now, I am going to prove that (V0, V1)
are exchangeable conditional on (Y0, Y1), which will ensure that both SI and AI are veriﬁed.
This amounts to checking that for every v ≤ v′,
fV0,V1|Y0,Y1(v, v
′|y0, y1) = fV0,V1|Y0,Y1(v′, v|y0, y1).
This equality is obviously true when v = v′. When v < v′,
fV0,V1|Y0,Y1(v, v
′|y0, y1) = fV0,V1|Y0,Y1(v′, v|y0, y1) = 0,
except when (v, v′) ∈ [t1, t2]× [t3, t4]. Let (v, v′) ∈ [t1, t2]× [t3, t4].
fV0,V1|Y0,Y1(v, v
′|y0, y1)
= P (C|Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1)P (B = 1|Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1, C)fW1(v)fW3(v′)
= P (F |Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1)fW1(v)fW3(v′)
= fV0,V1|Y0,Y1(v
′, v|y0, y1).
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The ﬁrst equality follows from the deﬁnition of V0 and V1 and from Bayes rule. Indeed,
one can check that observations verifying (V0, V1) ∈ [t1, t2]× [t3, t4] must be compliers such
that B = 1. The last equality also follows from the deﬁnition of V0 and V1: observations
verifying (V1, V0) ∈ [t1, t2]× [t3, t4] must be deﬁers. This proves the result.
QED.
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